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Without fail we recognize a great text from a great thinker by the fact that,
in addition to and beyond what it intends to demonstrate (and indeed does
demonstrate), it offers further resources, sometimes long unnoticed, for
illuminating questions arising well after the text was written, and which
come, at least so it would seem, from entirely different preoccupations. Of
course the point is never to make a text say what it in fact does not say
within the context of a debate for which it was not written; rather, the point
is to allow it to say everything that it can contribute today to a second debate
that is added to the first one and extends it in other terms. A text truly gives
us food for thought when it reveals, in addition to its explicit intention, a
potentially multiple pertinence that awaits the opportunity that will make
manifest one of its possible significations for a question that it probably did
not imagine, even if, in fact, it may have made that question possible.
Such is the case with Nicholas of Cusa, whose De visione Dei sive de Icona
encounters, beyond the question of the vision of God, numerous contem-
porary debates concerning visibility in general, and thus the dimensions of
phenomenality—namely, questions concerning the icon as a type of phe-
nomenon, the reversal of vision into a countervision, the distinction be-
tween the object or the nonobject of the seen, and the possibility of see-
ing the other. These will be the themes that I will attempt to follow in my
reading of De visione Dei, a text that indeed illuminates them, but which also
in turn receives from them a new pertinence.
I. THE ALL-SEEING
Let us begin by noting a characteristic trait of this debate in play in De
visione Dei: Cusanus’s aim is not so much to set out a theoretical position as
* Translated by Stephen E. Lewis. This article is the text of Jean-Luc Marion’s 2015 Mor-
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it is to propose to a monastic community (the Benedictines of Tegernsee)
an experience (“vos experimentaliter in sacratissimam obscuritatem manu-
ducere” [I will attempt to lead you experientially into the most sacred
darkness])1 of mystical theology in order to convince them of its paradox-
ical accessibility (“circa facilitatem mysticae theologiae” [about the facility
of mystical theology]).2 Indeed, De visione Dei enters into a debate opened by
the publication of Cusa’sDocta ignorantia, which had opposed, among others,
Vincent of Aggsbach (Impugnatorium doctae ignorantiae, 1453) against Betrand
of Waging, the prior of the Tegernsee monastery (Laudatorium doctae igno-
rantia, 1451; Defensorium laudatorii doctae ignorantiae, 1459). At stake was the
possible reinterpretation of the theologia mystica according to Denys the
Areopagite through the via moderna, as purely affective, a love of mere will
without any theological knowledge (and thus against the interpretation of
Thomas Aquinas and of the via antiqua).3 The request for enlightenment
made to Nicholas of Cusa by the abbot of Tegernsee, Caspar of Aindorffer,
sets forth the problem straightforwardly: “Est autem hec quaestio utrum
anima devota sine intellectus cognicione, vel etiam sine cogitacione previa
1 Quotations from Nicholas of Cusa’s De visione Dei sive de Icona follow the edition of Heide
Dorothea Riemann: Nicolai de Cusa, Opera omnia iussu et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Hei-
delbergensis, vol. 6 (Hamburg:Meiner, 2000), citing by chapter, section, andpage; here,De visione
Dei, §1, 3. For other works, I quote from Nikolaus von Kues, Philosophisch-theologischen Schriften,
ed. Leo Gabriel (Vienna: Herder, 1967). I also refer to the recent translation by H. Lawrence
Bond, in his collection Nicolas of Cusa: Selected Spiritual Writings (New York: Paulist, 1997), 235–
89. Here, seeDe visione Dei, §1, Bond, 235. The emphasis on experience is constantly evident: “et
quisque vestrum experietur” (and each of you will experience that) (Praefatio, §3, 5; Bond, 236);
“frater . . . experietur visum in eo figi” (the brother . . . will experience the gaze as fastened on
him) (ibid., §4, 6; Bond, 236); “in hac tua imagine providentiam tuam quadam sensibili ex-
perientia intueor” (in this image of you I now behold your providence by a certain sensible
experience) (IV, §9, 13; Bond, 239); “te me diligere experior” (I experience that you love me)
(IV, §10, 14; Bond, 239); “apprehendere experimentali contactu” (to know through the touch
of experience) (V, §13, 17; Bond, 241); “experior, quomodo necesse est me intrare caliginem”
(I experience how necessary it is for me to enter into the cloud) (IX, §36, 34; Bond, 251);
“clare experior, quod tu simul omnia vides et singula” (I experience clearly that you see all
things and each thing together) (X, §38, 35; Bond, 252); “Experior bonitatem tuam” (I expe-
rience your goodness) (XI, §43, 39; Bond, 254); “experior in contracto amore” (in contracted
love I experience) (XVII, §72, 59; Bond, 267); “Et hoc experior hac praxi” (this I experience in
the following application) (XVII, §77, 61; Bond, 269); “Experimur” (it is our experience) (XXII,
§98, 76; Bond, 280); “innobis experimur intellectum locumesse, ubi verbummagistri capitur” (in
our experience the intellect is the place where the word of a teacher is received) (XXII, §100, 78;
Bond, 281, mod.); “Sic experimur” (in similar fashion we experience) (XXIV, §110, 83; Bond,
285).
2 De visione Dei, §1, 3; Bond, 235, which is found again in the conclusion: “Quid facilius quam
credere Deo? . . . Nihil enim astruis credenti difficile et nihil amanti denegabile” (What is
easier than to believe God? . . . you teach nothing difficult for a believer and nothing a lover
can refuse) (XXIV, §114, 86; Bond, 287).
3 On this debate, see the classic studies of Edmond Vansteenberghe, Autour de la docte ig-
norance: Une controverse sur la théologie mystique du XVe siècle, vol. 14 of Beiträge zur Geschichte der
Philosophie des Mittelalters (Münster: Aschendorff, 1915); C. Trottmann, “Mystique, sagesse et
théologie: La place de la mystique entre théologie et vision béatifique à la fin du Moyen-Age,”
in Les enjeux philosophiques de la mystique, ed. D. de Courcelles (Grenoble: Millon, 2007); and
recently, K. Meredith Ziebart, Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and Intellect: A Case Study in 15th Century
Fides-Ratio Controversy (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014).
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vel concomitante, solo affectu seu per mentis apicem quam vocant synder-
esimDeum attingere possit, et in ipsum immediatemoveri aut ferri” (This is
the question: whether the devout soul, without the exercise of the intellect or
even without a preceding or simultaneous exercise of it, could attain God by
affection alone or by the summit of the mind which they call synderesis and be
moved or carried immediately within Him).4 If in effect the union with God
is made without knowledge, through immediate affectus, then the via mystica
becomes not only unintelligible but also irrational, reserved for some and
inaccessible to others because without reason and, therefore, without pos-
sible initiation: “Theologia sciencia, precipue mistica, paucissimis admodum
cognita” (Theological science, especially the mystical, which is known to very
few).5 In what sense is theologia mystica still accessible, if its experience is solely
open to an affectus without knowledge? And doesn’t Nicholas of Cusa’s intro-
duction of theology as pure docta ignorantia belong to the same irrationalist
drift?
Nicholas of Cusa’s response to these questions will thus have to open
access to an experience of theologia mystica but at the same time guarantee
its intelligibility and rationality. In fact, it will have to reproduce the very
intention of Denys the Areopagite in his own treatise entitled Mystical
Theology, as Nicholas of Cusa himself makes clear in a 1453 letter to the
monks of Tegernsee: “Sed in hoc libello ubi theologiam misticam et se-
cretam vult manifestare possibili modo, saltat supra disiunctionem usque in
copulacionem et coincidenciam, seu unionem simplicissimam que est non
lateralis sed directe supra omnem ablacionem et posicionem, ubi ablacio
coincidat cum posicione, et negacio cum affirmacione; et illa est secretis-
sima theologia, ad quam nullus phylosophorum accessit, neque accedere
potest stante principio communi tocius phylosophie, scilicet quod duo con-
tradictoria non coincidant” (In this book [De mystica theologia], in which he
[Denys] wished to reveal in a possible way mystical and secret theology, he
rises above disjunction even to union and coincidence, or most simple
union, which is not on the same level but directly above all removal and
addition, where removal coincides with addition and negation with affir-
mation. And that is the most secret theology to which none of the philos-
ophers approach; nor can one of them approach while the common prin-
ciple of all philosophy, that is, that two contradictories do not coincide,
endures).6 Theologia mysticamust surpass the principle of noncontradiction
4 Quoted in Ziebart, Nicolaus Cusanus, 155 n. 77, with English translation 154.
5 Ibid., 154 n. 75; English translation, 154.
6 Letter of Cusanus to Aindorffer and the monks of Tegernsee, September 14, 1453; English
translation, Ziebart, Nicolaus Cusanus, 161–62. The letter then concludes: “Unde necesse est
mistice theologizantem supra omnem racionem et intelligenciam, eciam se ipsum linquendo,
se in caliginem inicere; et reperiet quomodo id quod racio iudicat impossibile, scilicet esse et
non esse simul, est ipsa necessitas, ymmo, nis videretur tanta caligo impossibilitatis et densitas,
non esset summa necessitas que illi impossibilitati non contradicit; sed impossibilitas est ipsa vera
necessitas” (quoted inE. Vansteenberghe, Autour de la docte ignoranc, 114–15; and in Ziebart, Ni-
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as understood by philosophy, but it must also contradict it by principle,
according to a necessity that is itself rational—namely, that when God is
at issue, the opposites coincide and the impossible becomes necessary.7
Indeed, this seems to be the goal of De visione Dei: to open, according to a
certain paradoxical rationality, the experience of that which passes beyond
reason as understood by philosophy.
In order thus to arrive rationally at theologia mystica, Nicholas of Cusa
proposes to the monks of Tegernsee the experience of doing so, through
a praxis (“in praxi”).8 A praxis, that is, an operation that produces noth-
ing outside of the one who operates it (poēsis is not involved), but which
modifies the one who operates it, to the point that, upon being repeated,
it confers on him a new way of behaving, another habitus. What is this op-
eration? Precisely, the praxis of a phenomenon, a phenomenal praxis: that
of contemplating the “image of someone who sees all,” the imago omnia vi-
dentis, the figuram cuncta videntis.9 Such images show to the spectator’s gaze
another gaze, painted, which seems to have the property of seeing compre-
hensively everything that appears before it; to the point that each spectator
has the impression that, regardless of where he is, it is on him (and him
alone) that this gaze falls, a gaze that is in the strict sense universal (that
turns in every direction), such that at any point along the 180 degrees swept
by this gaze, each person has the impression that it is he alone who it sights
and sees: “Quisque vestrum experietur, ex quocumque loco eandem [namely,
figuram] inspexerit, se quasi solum per eam videri” (Each of you will ex-
perience that from whatever place one observes it the face will seem to
regard him alone).10 Of course, in order to verify this, each person must
confirm with the other the same experience, and thus it is right to note that
what is at stake is an experience that is not only communitarian, but which
presupposes trust (credere) in the witness of one’s neighbor.11
7 On Nicholas of Cusa’s use of the impossible (and on the use of the impossible in general),
see my indications in Negative Certainties, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2015), chap. 2, especially §§10–11 (64–74).
8 De visione Dei, Praefatio, §2, 5; Bond, 235. See also: “vos . . . per quandam praxim devotionis
in mysticam propono elevare theologiam” (I propose to uplift you . . . through a certain de-
votional exercise, to mystical theology) (§4b, 7; Bond, 237), and “Et hoc experior in praxi” (this
I experience in the following application) (XVII, §77, 61; Bond, 269).
9 Ibid., §2, 5; Bond, 235.
10 Ibid., §3, 5; Bond, 236.
11 According to Michel de Certeau’s fitting remark: “for want of a common vision, each has
to believe the other. The protocol of a verbal agreement between them is made up of suc-
cessive acts . . . ordered to the production of a shared judgment or sentence” (“Nicolas de
Cues: Le secret d’un regard,” in Traverses [Paris, 1984], 30–31; English translation: “The Gaze
colaus Cusanus, 162 n. 94). English translation, Ziebart,Nicolaus Cusanus, 161–62: “Therefore, it
is necessary for anyone doing theology mystically to rise above all reason and understanding,
likewise by abandoning himself, to enter into the darkness. And he will find how what reason
judges to be impossible, that is, to be and not to be at the same time, is necessary itself so that,
unless suchdarkness anddensity of impossibility is seen, there would not be a supremenecessity
which does not contradict that impossibility; but that impossibility is true necessity itself.”
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Nicholas of Cusa lists several examples of such an all-seeing figure, thus
referring to an experience widely held by a large public. And yet, of the
four examples mentioned, only one remains known to us: that of a char-
acter from a scene in The Justice of Trajan painted by Roger van der Weyden;
indeed, the figure of a face stands out, cutting through the crowd around
it, that could very well be that of the painter himself: “Bruxellis Rogeri
maximi pictoris in pretiotissima tabula.”12 Nevertheless, the essential lies
elsewhere: how is it that the painting, and thus the image of a figure, and,
read with further precision, that of an immobile face, could succeed in giv-
ing the impression to each and every spectator that its gaze follows and
pursues him without stopping, wherever he goes in the space covered by
this gaze? Recently H. Lawrence Bond set forth the conditions that this rep-
resentation of an all-seeing gaze must fulfill. In sum, the figure of this face
must clearly attract the spectator’s attention by overlooking the scene that
frames it and thus must not merge with its environment (neither the décor,
nor the other characters, etc.) or depend on the time and the place of the
plot (the historical anecdote or pretext); and, in order to succeed, this fig-
ure must offer a face that is at once fairly neutral, in order to appear atem-
poral and universal and applicable to every sighting, but also able to make
a power that is nonfocused (unexplicit) and ever active stand out.13 Now, in
a sense, it happens that these conditions are fulfilled fairly frequently, to
the point where sometimes it is hard to know whether one is dealing with
a human all-seeing gaze or one that is divine and Christic, for example in the
famous case of Dürer’s (self-)portrait (or not) (1500, Alte Pinakothek, Mu-
12 De visione Dei, Praefatio, §2, 5; Bond, 235. This fresco, painted at the Hôtel de Ville of Brus-
sels, is only known to us today through its reproduction in the form of the tapestry at Berne. See
the demonstration by Edwin Panofsky, “Facies illa Rogeri Maximi pictoris,” in Late Classical and
Medieval Studies in Honor of Albert Mathias Friend, Jr., ed. K. Weizmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1955), which dates Nicholas of Cusa’s visit to Brussels in February–March 1451
(two years before the writing of De visione Dei) and which identifies the three other examples
invoked here, and now lost: the archer overlooking the square in Nuremburg, the angel from
the castle at Brixen, and the painting fromNicholas of Cusa’s personal chapel at Koblenz, about
which more later.
13 See H. Lawrence Bond, “The ‘Icon’ and the ‘Iconic Text’ in Nicholas of Cusa’s De visione
Dei,” in Nicholas of Cusa and His Age: Intellect and Spirituality, Essays Dedicated to the Memory of
F. Edward Cranz, Thomas P. McTihe and Charles Trinkaus, ed. C. M. Ballitto and Th. M. Izbicki
(Leiden: Brill, 2002), 182.
of Nicholas of Cusa,” trans. Catherine Porter, Diacritics 17, no. 3 [1987]: 19, modified). Which
does not, of course, authorize the conclusion that “the filial here gives way to the fraternal in
the vision of God” or that “the faith . . . is not in God first of all, but in man or in the other”
(Emmanuel Falque, “L’omnivoyant: Fraternité et vision de Dieu chez Nicolas de Cues,” Revue
des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques 98, no. 1 [2014]: 65). Aside from its profoundly non-
theological character, this hasty conclusion presupposes exactly what has to be demonstrated:
how would “brothers” be able to trust one another if they had not already participated in the
same filial sighting or aim? In other words, what does “fraternal” mean if no “filial” relation
makes it possible, and if the “brothers” are not first of all sons tied together precisely by the same
experience of sonship, namely, for each among them, that of having been seen by the same
gaze?
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nich).14 Thus, precisely because an all-seeing figure remains relatively com-
mon (and for that very reason amounts to a good choice for opening up
an experience for the monks of Tegernsee, as well as for the reader of the
treatise), the establishment of the figura cuncta videntis is not enough to de-
fine the proper goal of De visione Dei (the experience of theologia mystica). We
must specify this figura as that which bears the universal gaze of God—in
this case, the gaze of Christ as an all-seeing face.
II. RECOGNITION OF THE ICON
The entire question thus becomes that of knowing what facies and what
figura Nicholas of Cusa proposes for the experience and the praxis of the
all-seeing—what painting (imago, tabella) must be privileged? He himself
makes the question all the more inevitable when he declares to the monks
of Tegernsee that he is sending precisely such a tabella to them along with
his text De visione Dei. Even though all trace of it has been lost, we do have at
our disposal two arguments allowing for its characterization. First, Cusanus
explicitly names the painting containing the face of the all- seeing one an
icon: “mitto tabellam figuram cuncta videntis tenentem, quam icona Dei
appello” (I am sending . . . a painting . . . containing an all- seeing image,
which I call an icon of God). The distinction between the two terms leaves
no doubt: in the sensibilis figura, it was considered in one sense a painting
(“tabellamfiguram . . .tenentem”)and,intheother,bywhatthispaintingshows,
namely, the icon and its omnidirectional gaze (“figuram cuncta videntis . . .
quam iconam appello”).15 Moreover, we find this same firm distinction be-
tween, on the one hand, the painted image (“haec imago faciei tuae . . . sic
sensibiliter depicta,” “haec picta imago, quam intueor”),16 and, on the other,
14 See the clarifications by Werner Beierwaltes in the “Addendum: Cusanus und Dürer” to his
notable “Visio facialis—Sehen ins Angesicht: Zur Coincidenz des endlichen und unendlichen
Blicks bei Cusanus,” Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse Sitzung-
sberichte 1988. Heft 1 (Munich: Verlag der Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1988).
Moreover, the conclusion of De visione Dei seems to suggest that Christ himself is the painter of
his icon (XXV, §116, 88; Bond, 287).
15 De visione Dei, Praefatio, §2, 5; Bond, 235.
16 The gap between the painted imago and the eicona itself is clearly marked here: “Agit
autem intuitus tuus, ut considerem, quomodo haec imago faciei tuae eaptropter est sic sen-
sibiliter depicta, quia depingi non potuit facies sine colore nec color sine quantitate exsistit. Sed
video non oculis carneis, qui hanc eiconam tuam inspiciunt, sed mentalibus et intellectualibus
oculis veritatem faciei tuae invisibilem, quae in umbra hic contracta significatur” (And your
gaze prompts me to consider how this image of your face is thus portrayed in a sensible fash-
ion since a face could not have been painted without color and color does not exist without
quantity. But I see the invisible truth of your face, represented in this contracted shadow here,
not with the eyes of flesh, which examine this icon of you, but with the eyes of the mind and
the intellect) (ibid., VI, §17, 20; Bond, 242–43; emphasis added). And again: “Admiror, Do-
mine, postquam tu simul omnes et singulos respicis, uti haec etiam picta figurat imago, quam
intueor, quomodo coincidat in virtute tua visiva universale cum singulari” (You look on all
and each together, even as does this painted image that I contemplate, and so I marvel, O Lord,
at how in your visual faculty the universal coincides with the particular) (IX, §32, 31; Bond, 249).
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the icon (“visus eiconae”);17 to the point that the passage from the one to the
other is sometimes thematized as such: “visus eiconae te aeque undique
respicit et non deserit quocumque pergas”;18 and “Sto coram imagine faciei
tuae, Deus meus, quam oculis sensibilibus respicio, et nitor oculis inter-
ioribus intueri veritatem, quae in pictura signatur” (I stand before this im-
age of your face, my God, which I observe with the eyes of sense, and I
attempt with inward eyes to behold the truth that is designated in the pic-
ture);19 or “Video in haec picta facie figuram infinitatis” (I see in this painted
face an image of infinity).20 This gap between the physical vision of the im-
age put into a painting ( figura, imago, facies subtili arte pictoria, tabella) and the
icon’s aim (visus iconae) thus structures the entire experience in praxi and
therefore the entirety of De visione Dei.
Another indication confirms that only an icon can be at issue: among
the four examples of paintings representing an all-seeing figure, Nicholas
of Cusa mentions the one which, without any doubt, was the most familiar
to him, and the dearest: “Confluentiae in capella mea veronica” (that of a
veronica in my chapel at Koblenz).21 Since Panofsky’s demonstration, no
one can contest that what he is mentioning here is not an image of St. Ve-
ronica (Why her? Why would she see omnidirectionally?), but that of the
very facies of Christ walking to his death, as imprinted on the veil held out
by a woman to wipe his face, thus constituting the vera icona.22 Plainly stated,
Nicholas of Cusa proposes to the monks of Tegernsee the experience of
seeing themselves seen by an all-seeing facies, not in general, but with the
very precise and particular case of an icon, that is to say of the image “not
made by human hands” of the face of Christ himself, whose gaze sees all and
at the same time each one individually. The point is not simply to experience
an all-seeing figure (an angel or an archer, the self-portrait of a painter, and
17 Ibid., Praefatio, §3, 6; Bond, 236: “the icon’s gaze.” See: “nihil posse apparere circa visum
eiconae Dei, quin verius sit in vero visu Dei” (nothing concerning the gaze of the icon of God
can be apparent that is not truer in the true gaze of God) (I, §5, 10; Bond, 237).
18 Ibid., IV, §9, p. 13; Bond, 239: “Accede nunc tu, frater contemplator, ad Dei eiconam . . .
quia visus eiconae te aeque undique respicit et non deserit, quocumque pergas” (Now, brother
contemplative, approach the icon of God . . . the icon’s gaze regards you equally everywhere and
does not leave you wherever you may go).
19 Ibid., X, §38, 35; Bond, 252.
20 Ibid., XV, § 61, 51; Bond, 262–63.
21 Ibid., Praefatio, §1, 5; Bond, 235 (and see Bond’s notes 10–11 on 324).
22 Panofsky concludes that this formula “must therefore be interpreted not as ‘the face
of the St. Veronica in my chapel,’ but as ‘the face of the vera icon [namely, Christ?] in my
chapel’ ” (“Facies illa Rogeri Maximi pictoris,” 385). He also recalls (ibid., 395) the older mean-
ing of the term: “Veronica : Romanis appellatur tabella, in qua Christi Domini, pergentis ad Crucis
supplicium, divino miraculo expressa effigies efformatur. . . . Imago tabellam praedicta reprae-
sentans” (Veronica : is defined among the Romans as a little tablet on which is formed a likeness,
imprinted by divine miracle, of the Lord Christ proceeding to the torment of the Cross. . . . An
image representing the above tablet) (quotation from Charles du Fresne du Cange, Glossarium
mediae et infimae latinitatis, 2nd ed. [Paris, 1938], 8:285 [Translator’s note: Thanks to Joseph
Almeida for the English translation]).
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so on), but, with the example of a true icon (veronica), to experience and to
practice Christ himself as the preeminently all- seeing, or in a word to see the
all-seeing (and only in this way the all knowing), the omnivoyant (and only
in this way the omnipotent).
These two arguments increase the reasons we have to oppose the unfor-
tunate tendency among some contemporary interpreters who do not wish
to accept the letter of the very title De visione Dei [sive de icona liber], and in-
stead speak only of a “painting.”23 This obstinate denial cannot be justified
by some worry on the part of Cusanus about keeping his distance from the
so-called Byzantine icon—after all, this would be rather strange for some-
one so dedicated to Christian unity.24 In fact, this philological resistance
probably testifies to their reticence in front of the very usage of eicona as
a concept. But this misology, far from opening the way to a better under-
standing of De visione Dei, simply results in our missing its basic intention:
to have (and facilitate) the experience of the vision of God through the
practice of the iconic gaze: “Non potest oculus mentis satiari videndo te
Ihesum, qui es complementum omnis mentalis pulchritudinis; et in hac
eicona conicio mirabilem valde ac stupidum visum tuum” (The eye of the
mind cannot be satiated in seeing you, O Jesus, because you are the com-
pletion of all mental beauty, and at this icon I conjecture about your ex-
ceedingly wonderful and astonishing gaze).25
23 This is a misinterpretation held by A. Minazzoli in his translation Le Tableau ou la vision en
Dieu (Paris: Cerf, 1986; republished by Belles Lettres [Paris, 2012]) without any real argument,
other than to avoid orienting “the imagination of the reader toward the singular domain of
Byzantine iconography” (ibid., 1st ed. 101, 2nd ed. 141). As if the concept of the icon (a)
related only to the history of art, when it in fact belongs as a concept to philosophy and
theology as such; (b) was limited to the Byzantine period and territory, when in fact it widely
overflows them in space and in time, for instance and at the minimum, in Romanmedieval art.
This disappointing misinterpretation was unfortunately orchestrated symphonically, without
further explanation, but in a caricatural manner, by Emmanuel Falque: “The novelty of the
procedure [namely, attributed to Nicholas of Cusa] forbids translating falsely the formula de
icona in the title (De visione Dei sive de icona) by of the Icon rather than of the Painting, as a number
of commentators have sometimes wrongly done” (“L’omnivoyant,” 47 n. 4). Forbids? What,
and who, forbids it? In fact, every translator, in every language (the French translator ex-
cepted), translates icona/eicona by icon, including P. Magnard himself (“Voir c’est être vue: Le
chiasme de la vision,” in Nicolas de Cues, penseur et artisan de l’unité, ed. D. Larre [Lyon: ENS
éditions, 2015], 62). It is the reader, instead, who finds himself dumbfounded before so much
self-assurance in forbidding the least bit of argumentation. See instead A. Stock, “Die Rolle der
‘icona Dei’ in der Spekulation De Visione Dei,” Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-
Gesellschaft 18 (1989): 50–62.
24 See on this point, among others, the conscientious study by M.-A. Vannier, “De visione Dei
von Nikolaus von Kues,” in Videre et videri coincidunt: Theorien des Sehens in der ersten Hälfte des 15.
Jahrhunderts, ed. Wolfgang C. Schneider, Harald Schwaetzer, Marc de Mey, and Inigo Bocken,
Texte und Studien zur Europäischen Geistesgeschichte, Reihe B, Band 1 (Münster: Aschen-
dorff, 2011).
25 De visione Dei, XXII, §94, 74; Bond, 278.
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III. SEEING, BEING SEEN
Once it has been established that Nicholas of Cusa indeed uses a concept of
the icon in order to define the visio Dei, or rather in order to open the
experience of it in praxi, we can pose the real question: what decisive con-
tribution does the use of this concept make? Let us note immediately that
we are not dealing here with a doctrine of the icon developed in and for
itself, but rather with a praxis of the icon as means of access to the expe-
rience of the vision of God: “Primo loco praesupponendum esse censeo
nihil posse apparere circa visum eiconae Dei, quin verius sit in vero visu
Dei” (As a first premise, I believe it should be presupposed that nothing
concerning the gaze of the icon of God can be apparent that is not truer
in the true gaze of God).26 The vision does not involve solely the icon, but,
through it, God himself, all the more so in that, according to an ancient
tradition (one that is not only Christian), “theos ab hoc dicitur, quia omnia
vidit” ([God] is called Theos because of the fact that [He] looks on all
things).27 God sees insofar as He is God, andGod-sees forms a tautology ( just
like the Anselmian designationmajor quam cogitari possit[what is greater than
can be thought] taken up in the same sentence). Thus, not only does the
visio Deimean both “to see God” and “God sees,” but above all and to begin
26 Ibid., I, §5, 10; Bond, 237.
27 Ibid., I, §5, 10; Bond, 237. See: “visus tuus, qui est theos, Deus” (your sight, which is Theos!)
(VIII, §31, 31; Bond, 249). Cusanus takes this up in other texts as well. Thus, “Puta cum Deus
theos dicatur a videndo et quaeratur quomodo sit videns, respondetur eomodo, quomesurans”
(For example, when God is called theos because of His seeing, and when we ask in what way
He sees, the answer is: in the way in which He measures) (Complementum theologicum XIV,
Philosophisch-theologischen Schriften, 3:700; English translation: Complete Philosophical and Theo-
logical Treatises of Nicholas of Cusa, trans. Jasper Hopkins [Minneapolis: Banning, 2001], 771).
And “Quare patet Deum, qui theos quod est a theoro seu video dicitur, visionem illam ante aliud
esse, quam non possimus perfectam nisi trinam videre, quodque ipsum videre infinitum et
interminatum in alio est videre non-aliud ab aliquo” (Therefore, it is evident that God, who is
called theos [(a word) which comes from “theoro,” i.e., “video”], is—prior to other—this vision
which we cannot see as perfect unless [we see it] as trine. [And (it is evident) that to see God in
an other—God, who is infinite and boundless—is to see (Him who is) not other than anything])
(De Li Non-Aliud, XXIII, Philosophisch-theologischen Schriften, 2:546; Hopkins, 1157). Or: “Non est
igitur theos nomen Dei, nisi ut quaeritur ab homine in hoc mundo. . . . Theos dicitur a theoro,
quod est video et curro. Currere igitur debet quaerens per visum, ut ad omnia videntem theon
pertingere possit” (Hence, “Theos ” is the name of God only insofar as God is sought, by human
beings, in this world. . . . “Theos” is derived from “theoro,” which means “I see” and “I hasten.”
Therefore, the seeker ought to hasten by means of sight, so that he can attain unto God, who
sees all things) (De quaerendo Deum, I, 19, Philosophisch-theologischen Schriften, 2:570; Hopkins,
315). This theme originates at least as far back as Denys the Areopagite (De divinis nominibus,
XII, 12), through the intermediary of John Scot Eriugena: “Igitur ὑπερθεός, plusquam videns, si
θεός videns interpretatur” (Therefore [a] hypertheos is taken to mean one who sees better than
normal, if [the word’s root] theos is taken to mean one who sees) (De divisione naturae I, 14, in
Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Latina, ed. Jacques -Paul Migne [Paris: Migne, 1865], vol. 122,
col. 460a; see also I, 12, ibid., PL 122, 452c [Translator’s note: Thanks to Joseph Almeida for
the English translation]). (Subsequent references to Patrologia Latina will be indicated by the
abbreviation “PL,” followed by the volume and column number in Arabic numerals).
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with that it belongs to God to see, before there is any question of some-
one else seeing God.28 God fully exercises vision, while man sees only by
derivation. In this way we better understand that the visio Dei is unfolded
through the practice of the icon; for it belongs precisely to the icon (and
preeminently to the icon of one that is all- seeing) that it gazes on him who
believed he was exercising his power of vision over it. The icon sees much
more essentially than it is seen; or rather, it sees so originarily and so com-
pletely the one who looks at it that it overturns the order of intentionality
and makes itself felt precisely through the experience of receiving a gaze
that is absolutely concentrated on each of the spectators. To see an icon
amounts to seeing oneself seen by it. And, in the case of the icon of an all-
seeing figure, this experience of seeing oneself seen is intensified. To begin
with, this icon shows a gaze that aims at each one of its spectators, giving at
least a face or a surface of itself to be seen; above all, the gaze that it shows
has the property of following the eyes (or of seeming to do so—which in praxi
amounts to the same thing) of each one of the spectators, no matter where
he is or where he moves. Its all-seeing gaze sees everything together, cuncta
videns: “Visus tuus, cum sit oculus seu speculum vivum, in se omnia videt”
(Since your sight is an eye or living mirror, it sees all things in itself). More-
over, this gaze sees not so much what it has in front of it (and which would
condition it), as it does that which arises from the very fact of seeing itself
seen: “immo quia causa omnium visibilium, hinc omnia in causa et ratione
omnium, hoc est in se ipso, complectitur et videt” (Even more, since [your,
i.e., God’s, sight] is the cause of all that can be seen, it embraces and sees all
things in the cause and reason of all, that is, in itself).29 Thus we understand
the reasoning better: clearly, no finite gaze (and even less the painted gaze
on a painting) can genuinely and completely function as an all-seeing icon;
every gaze in this world indeed remains contractus, concentrated on and
restricted to such or such object, and is never universal. Nevertheless, we can
conceive of an absolute gaze (visus abstractus), and we must do so if we are
concerned with major quam cogitari possit.30 And in this case, what is nearly
true for the icona Dei is absolutely true for the visus Dei: “Quare, si visus pictus
apparere potest in imagine simul omnia et singula inspiciens, cum hoc sit
perfectionis visus, non poterit veritati minus convenire veraciter quam ei-
28 See Werner Beierwaltes: “‘Unser’ Sehen (Gott im Bild) ist zugleich ein von ihm (dem aus
dem Bild Blickenden) Gesehen Werden” (“Visio facialis—Sehen ins Angesicht,” 13). Or: “daß das
Gesehen-Werden Gottes durch Andere sein eigenes Sehen als ein Von-Ihm-selbst-Gesehen-
Werden zur Voraussetzung hat” (“Vision absoluta: Reflexionen als Grundzug des göttlichen
Prinzips bei Nicolaus Cusanus,” in Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschafte, Phi-
losophisch-historische Klasse [Heidelberg, 1978]). And see also H. Lawrence Bond: “The De visione
might be more appropriately entitled ‘God’s sight,’ for the central focus is God’s vision of us, not
ours of God.” Or: “Our seeing is a being seen. God is never the object of our sight; God is the
eternal subject of seeing” (Bond, “The ‘Icon’ and the ‘Iconic Text’ in Nicholas of Cusa’s De
visione Dei,” 185 and 197).
29 De visione Dei, VIII, §30; Bond, 249.
30 Ibid., I, §5, 10; Bond, 237.
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conae seu apprentiae apparenter” (If, therefore, the painted gaze in the
icon can appear to be observing all and each at the same time, and since this
faculty is of the perfection of sight, it cannot truly pertain to the truth less
than it apparently pertains to the icon or appearance).31 But there is more:
not only does the icon see all and each, it gives the impression to each
spectator that Christ aims only at him and even looks at him more than at
any other: “agit cuiuslibet quasi de solo eo, qui experitur se videri, et nullo
alio curet, adeo quod etiam concipi nequeat per unum, quem respicit, quod
curam alterius agat” (He will see that it takes diligent care of each, just as if
it cared only for the one on whom its gaze seems to rest and for no other,
and to such an extent that the one whom it regards cannot conceive that it
should care for another).32 We will have to try to understand the legitimacy
of what at first seems to be an illusory and even condemnable egocentrism
(see Sec. IV of this essay). In any case, this feeling of exclusive visibility in
the gaze of the all-seeing confirms that God’s vision thus plays out in the
experience of the icon, which looks at me, whoever and wherever I may be;
to the point that we can even consider that every real icon puts into play
an all-seeing gaze and that Nicholas of Cusa here describes the very essence
of every icon.
And indeed, the definition that Nicholas of Cusa here proposes of the
visio Dei reaches into the fundamental character of the icon—namely, that
it sees us more than we see it.33 “Quid aliud, Domine, est videre tuum,
quando me pietatis oculo respicis, quam [te] a me videri? Videndo me das
te a me videri, qui es Deus absconditus. Nemo te videre potest, nisi in quan-
tum tu das, ut videaris. Nec est aliud te videre, quam quod tu videas vi-
dentem te” (What other, O Lord, is your seeing, when you look upon me
with the eye of mercy, than your being seen by me? In seeing me you, who
are the hidden God, give yourself to be seen by me. No one can see you
except in the measure you grant to be seen. Nor is your being seen other
than your seeing one who sees you).34 The reasoning is clear: I can very well
say that I see God, but that can only be if God, this God who remains a
hidden God, grants it to me; and he does not give himself to be seen by
someone else, except by giving it, and thus, first of all, by he himself seeing
this someone who then, possibly, will see him. In order for a face to see the
face of God, it is necessary that God first turn his face toward those who gaze
31 Ibid. See the excellent commentary by Ziebart, Nicolaus Cusanus, 189.
32 De vision Dei, Praefatio, §4, 6; Bond, 236.
33 This point in common between the icon according to the phenomenological sense I gave
it (see God without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990;
2nd ed. 2012], chap. 1) and its meaning according to Nicholas of Cusa was taken note of
(before I had made the least connection with De visione Dei) by H. B. Gerl-Falkovilz, “Der Gott-
Gedanke des Nikolaus von Kues und seine erkenntnistheoretische Bedeutung für die Geg-
enwart,” in Der Gottes-Gedanke des Nikolaus von Kues, ed. W. A. Euler, Akten des Symposiums in
Trier von 21. bis 23. Oktober 2010,Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft, 33
(Trier, 2012).
34 De visione Dei, V, §13, 17; Bond, 241.
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at it: “Ita est facies tua ad omnes facies te intuentes conversa. . . .Qui igitur
amorosa facie te intuetur, non reperiet nisi faciem tuam se amorose in-
tuentem” (Your face is turned to all faces which look on you. . . .Whoever
looks on you with a loving face will find only your face looking on oneself
with love).35 There is nothing else to see of God than the fact that he sees
me and that our gazes cross. But this crossing of gazes is enough to define
love: “visus tuus videt omnem visum videntem.”36 Thus, rather than it being
the case that seeing God is opposed to seeing oneself seen by God, these two
terms, opposed from our point of view, coincide in God’s point of view, and
it is precisely this very coincidence that the (iconic) praxis of the visio Dei
teaches to every creature: “Nam ibi es, . . . ubi videre coincidit cum videri. . . .
Ab omnibus creaturis es visibilis et omnes vides; in eo enim, quod omnes
vides, videris ab omnibus. Aliter enim esse non possunt creaturae, quia
visione tua sunt; quod si te non viderent videntem, a te non caperent esse.
Esse creaturae est videre tuum pariter et videri” (For you are there . . . where
seeing coincides with being seen. . . . You are visible by all creatures and you
see all. In that you see all you are seen by all. For otherwise creatures cannot
exist since they exist by your vision. If they did not see you who see, they
would not receive being from you. The being of a creature is equally your
seeing and your being seen).37 Seeing God first of all signifies that God sees
35 Ibid., VI, §19, 21; Bond, 243.
36 Ibid., VII, §29, 29, which continues: “et omne visibile et omnem actum visionis et omnem
virtutem videntem et omnem virtutem visibilem et omne ex ipsis exsurgens videre, quia omnia
causas.” Bond, 248: “your gaze sees every sight that sees, everything that can be seen and every
act of seeing and also every act of seeing and also every power of seeing, every power of being
seen and every actual seeing that results from them both. Since your seeing is causing, you who
cause everything see everything.” On the crossing of gazes, see my “L’intentionnalité de
l’amour,” in Emmanuel Lévinas, ed. J. Rolland, Les Cahiers de la Nuit surveillée (Paris: Verdier,
1984), republished in Jean-Luc Marion, Prolegomena to Charity, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), chap. 4.
37 De visione Dei, X, §40, 36; Bond, 253. See: “Et videndo creata simul et se videt. Creata enim,
quia creata, non videntur perfecte, nisi creator videatur. Et effectus perfecte non videtur, quia
effectus, nisi et causa videatur. Visio autem Dei est perfectissima et se videndo, cum sit causa,
videt omnia causata. Et causata videndo, cum sint causata, videt se, quia causa. Coincidunt in
Deo mensurare et mensurari, quia est mensura et mensuratum; sic et videre et videri coin-
icidunt et sic videre se est videri a se et videre creaturas est videri in creaturis” (With see-
ing created things He sees also Himself. For created things, because they are created, are not
seen perfectly unless their Creator is seen. Likewise, an effect, because it is an effect, is not seen
perfectly unless also its cause is seen. Now, God’s vision is most perfect. And since He is Cause:
in seeing Himself He sees all things caused. And since they are caused: in seeing Himself He
sees all things caused. And since they are caused: in seeing them God sees Himself, since He is
their Cause. InGod,measuring and beingmeasured coincide, becauseHe is both theMeasuring-
standard and What-is-measured. Similarly, [in Him], seeing and being seen coincide; and, like-
wise, His seeing Himself is His being seen by Himself, and His seeing creatures is His being
seen [by Himself] in creatures) (Complementum theologicum, chap. 14, ed. L. Gabriel, Philosophisch-
theologisch Schriften [Vienna: Herder, 1967], 3:702; Hopkins, 772). It is within this context of a
practice of the icon as reversal of the subject (and object) of vision that the text itself can become
iconic, as H. Lawrence Bond rightly notes: “Not only does Cusanus supply a material icon for
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always and everywhere the one who claims to see or imagines himself seeing
him, even if only in a glass darkly. But God sees me in the full light.
With this thesis—which gathers into focus the entire De visione Dei—
Nicholas of Cusa not only raises the notion of the icon to the level of its
concept, but, by thus granting it a universal meaning, justifies in advance its
approach by contemporary phenomenology. Indeed, what do we under-
stand by the word “icon” when we recognize in it, beyond its function in the
history of art (whether Byzantine or other), a mode of description of cer-
tain phenomena? What phenomena can and must be described as icons?
Elsewhere I have proposed defining the phenomenon of the other as an
icon.38 Indeed, the other does not show himself as a visible object in the
world—for the crowd of “others,” which occupies the environment of each
of us, does not offer access to an other in the proper sense, but only to the
spectacle of animated objects. We only have an other if a face is presented,
a face that is not summed up in a surface; that is to say, a gaze. Now, what
is proper to a gaze lies in its giving nothing to be seen directly: that which
exerts the gaze, the eyes and more precisely the pupils, show nothing and
express nothing, consisting only in a black point, or even less—a black hole,
empty of the visible and thus of meaning. Why, then, when we wish to grasp
the other as such, do we attach ourselves precisely to the point of his in-
dividuality that is the least visible, even the least expressive, the void of the
pupil, when his general attitude, his body language, the expressions of his
mouth and of his entire face tell us much more? There is only one answer:
because the movement of the eyes and of the pupils, which certainly show
nothing visible, nevertheless show indirectly and unquestionably whether
or not the other truly looks at me, by aiming right in my eyes or following
me consistently, with the all-seeing gaze of the icon. The other does not
become visible insofar as I see him (for I would probably only see an object
among others), but to the precise extent that, with his invisible gaze, he sees me.
Now, Nicholas of Cusa arrives at exactly this result in his description of the
icona Dei, as it explains the vision: in God there is no other face to see than
the gaze that aims at me: “Visus tuus, Domine, est facies tua” (Your vision,
Lord, is your face).39 In other words, the very reasons that led Nicholas of
Cusa to conceive the visio Dei according to the model of the icon lead us to
apply this same iconic model to the gaze of the other.
38 See Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L.
Kosky (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), §23, and In Excess: Studies in Saturated
Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud (New York: Fordham University Press,
2002), chap. 5.
39 De visione Dei, VI, §19; Bond, 243.
the monks to use, but he makes both the text and also the contemplator iconic” (“The ‘Icon’
and the ‘Iconic Text’ in Nicholas of Cusa’s De visione Dei,” 183).
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IV. SEEING AND SEEING ONESELF SEEN: THE APORIA OF THE OTHER
Consequently, I will not take up here the analysis of the icon that Nicho-
las of Cusa puts at the center and the heart of the visio Dei. To do that it
would be necessary to explain his developments by comparing them with
previous analyses of the vision of God (those of Denys, Proclus, Augustine,
Eriugena, Eckhart, etc.) and of the theology of the icon. For lack of time
I will not venture it here, both because such an immense labor calls for
interpreters qualified in other ways than I, and also because I would like to
indicate how the iconic doctrine of the visio Dei in its turn allows us, through
its phenomenological rigor, to take up the classic phenomenological apo-
rias not so much of the vision of God, but of the other in general. And
perhaps to indicate the conditions for their solution.
On first consideration, the two terms that the Cusanian definition of the
icon puts into operation do not pose any difficulty: videre and videri, seeing
and seeing oneself seen,40 respond to one another as the active form of the
verb to its passive form; I am seen like I see, I see and, in turn, I am seen; in
fact, we customarily hold as settled that, when and in as much as we see a
thing, we know it as such. Of course, we admit that appearances can fool us
and that consequently it makes sense to test whether we see correctly; but
with these precautions taken (at least tangentially), vision offers the royal
road to true knowledge. Does this assumption remain valid when we pass
from seeing to seeing oneself seen? What truth flows from this experience of
seeing oneself seen? What parallel connects him who has the privilege of seeing
with the one (perhaps the same) who finds himself in the situation of seeing
himself seen? In reality, these two situations do not match up at all, as if
correlative and simply inverted operations were involved. First of all be-
cause when I see, I do not see that I see (unlike touch, where I see that I
feel, or hearing, where I understand that I produce a sound);41 thus, since I
do not see myself while seeing, even less can I see that someone is seeing
me, or see myself seen. But there is more. For, even if I see another’s gaze, I
do not see myself seen by him, because his gaze remains strictly speaking
invisible (it shows nothing); thus, in addition to the fact that the empty
gaze of the blind person does not allow me to see myself seen (instead I see
that he does not see me), neither the distracted gaze of the dreamer seeing
something else, so to speak, through me, nor that of the passerby hardly
40 It is preferable to translate videri by seeing oneself seen rather than by being seen, for two
reasons: first, in order not to overload from the outset a problem of (phenomenological)
vision with a problem of being (logical and ontological); and next so as to retain the basic
ambiguity of videri, which functions not only as a passive of videre, but as a means: it appears to me
that . . . , it seems to me that someone sees me.
41 “Visus se ipse non videt, licet in alio, quod videt, se videre attingat” (Sight does not see
itself, although it comes to be aware of itself in the other which it sees) (De Non-Aliud, XXIII, in
Philosophisch-Theologisch Schriften, 2:546; Hopkins, 1157). Here Nicholas of Cusa is writing in the
margins of Plato, Alcibiades 153a–b. See the astute remarks of Magnard, “Voir c’est être vu: Le
chiasme de la vision.”
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seeing memove across his visual ray, nor that of the seller seeking to seduce
a buyer—none among these sees me and gives me the certainty of seeing
myself seen. Thus most of the time, and at first glance, I see without ever
seeing myself see, or seeing myself seen. In the experience of finite vision,
that of men, I pass, seeing but invisible, among the gazes that see that which
I do not see, especially me myself. And furthermore, I most often seek, with
many precautions and stratagems, to see without having myself, who sees,
seen. This approach does not imply that I have become a spy, or that I work
for a private detective or am employed by the Fiat Lux Agency.42 It is enough
that I seek to protect my private life, that I inform myself about the society
around me, that I prepare all my moves by surrounding myself with the
greatest possible quantity of information; in short, that I never expose my-
self uselessly to the inquisitions of other social actors, or to their vision,
perceived as a threat, whether imagined or real.
I see, but I see without making myself seen. I do not dream so much of
becoming all-seeing as I fear becoming the universally visible, naked, seen
and known by all. Thus I desire to remain seeing without others being able
to see me see—I desire to become a voyeur. For, in order to accept without
reservation or fear that others see me, it should be necessary to assure
myself first of all that there are many gazes that truly direct their attention
to me (which the experience of social life constantly contradicts) and above
all that these gazes seeing me wish me well, that they “have me in their good
books,” in short that they are benevolent toward me—that they cast a good
eye over me. But for that outcome, it would be necessary that the aporia of
the access to the other already be resolved. In order to see myself seen, in
order to accept and tolerate seeing myself seen, much more is necessary
than reversing videre into a videri. Two conditions would have to be satisfied:
that there be alter egos and that they love me.
V. THE INACCESSIBILITY OF THE OTHER: ONLY THE OBJECT IS VISIBLE
These conditions are not fulfilled straightaway, nor most of the time. Not
for lack of subjective good will, but because the aporia of the other is in-
scribed through the necessity of the concept within modern metaphysics.
Indeed, the establishment of methodical knowledge grounded in reason
restricted Descartes to the possibility of considering other men, potential
others, only as objects, ruled by the same conditions of visibility as the things
of the world raised “to the standards of reason.”43 Thus, after having dem-
42 [Translator’s note: The Fiat Lux Agency is the headquarters of the hardboiled detective
Nestor Burma, featured in Léo Malet’s series of crime novels Les Nouveaux Mystères de Paris.]
43 René Descartes, Discours de la méthode, in Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Ch. Adam and P. Tannery
(1908; repr., Paris: Vrin/CNRS, 1966), VI:4 (subsequent citations from this work will be ab-
breviated “AT” followed by the volume number in Roman numerals and, in Arabic numerals,
the page number), and The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1:117.
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onstrated that the empirical thing (for instance, a piece of wax) could retain
its permanent self-identity beneath the different appearances imposed on
it by sensible variations only on the condition of being reduced to what the
inspectio mentis could conceive of it, he extended the same conclusion to
“men”: “Unde concluderem statim: ceram ergo visione oculi, non solius
mentis inspectione, cognosci; nisi jam forte respexissem ex fenestra ho-
mines in platea transeuntes, quos etiam ipsos nonminus usitate quamceram
dico me videre. Quid autem video praeter pileos et vestes, sub quibus latere
possent automata? Sed judico homines esse. Atque ita id quod putabam me
videre oculis, sola judicandi facultate, quae inmentemea est, comprehendo”
(But then if I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I
just happen to have done, I normally say that I see the men themselves, just
as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see any more than hats and coats which
could conceal automatons? I judge that they are men. And so something
which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the
faculty of judgement which is inmymind).44 To see an other [autrui], it is not
enough to see a quasi-other [quasi-autre] or a quasi-alter ego. I believe I am
seeing an other, but in fact I judge his identity indirectly, without seeing him
directly. What I in fact see—coats and hatsmoving about beneathmy gaze in
the street below—not only offers tomy gazemere theater costumes that I can
interpret freely either as men or as automata, but functions like the visible
sketches of a phenomenon that remains finally at first approach invisible.
And in fact, in the other, all that which could qualify him as a genuine alter
ego, an ego with the same status as I (his expression, his intentions, his
meanings)—none of that ever appears as such, but contributes only a sum
of appearances, still to be interpreted. And, in this interpretation, only my
ego decides if this is a man or not, just as it decides about every other object.
From this epistemological necessity, Pascal drew the unavoidable ethical
consequence: even I, who am the only ego as far as I think and I see,
nevertheless become, when the issue is seeing myself seen, no longer an
ego, but an object constituted as visible by another ego, who in his turn
becomes perfectly invisible: “A man goes to the window to see the people
44 René Descartes, Meditatio II, AT VII, 32, lines 4–12, and The Philosophical Writings of Des-
cartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1984), 2:21 (for a detailed commentary on this passage, see my analysis
in Questions Cartésiennes [Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1991], chap. 6). This is con-
firmed by this additional astonishing declaration: “I pay no more attention to the people I see
there than I would to the trees in your woods or the animals that browse there” (Descartes to
Balzac, May 5, 1631, AT I, 203; The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham,
Robert Stoothoff, DugaldMurdoch, and Anthony Kennedy [Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1991], 3:31, translation modified). Husserl thoroughly explored the impossibility in
principle of attaining immediately to the phenomenality of the other man as other and thus
the necessity of not approaching him straightaway except as an object. SeeCartesianMeditations,
§50, in EdmundHusserl,GesammelteWerke (Husserliana), ed.Walter Biemel (TheHague:Martinus
Nijhoff, 1954–), I, 139.
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passing by; if I pass by, can I say he went there to see me? No, for he is not
thinking of me in particular. But what about a person who loves someone
for the sake of her beauty; does he love her ? No, for smallpox, which will
destroy beauty without destroying the person, will put an end to his love for
her.”45 Here there is no ego that is seen, but only a new object (for only the
object can be seen, and every seeing makes that which it sees its object); no
ego can see itself, precisely because it sees; and in seeing, it must remain
out of view, become invisible. From now on, in order to see more than an
object in me and of me, an ego must operate by analogy, apperception,
empathy, transference, and so on, all operations that are not seen and do
not make a new phenomenon directly visible. Thus I never see the Other
as an other me, an other ego, for I see of it only what one can see: the
characteristics of a visible object (form, space, quantities, time, etc.). In or-
der to reach the “person” it would be necessary to add judgment, an inspec-
tio mentis, a particular intention, and so on; in short, all that which vision
cannot reach, nor give. And in turn, when I see myself seen, I do not see
myself seen as myself, but as that which one can see of me as an object. And
this is why, moreover, I am the first one to be unable to see myself, and the
last one to know myself, since I can approach myself only as one of the ob-
jects that I know from the outside. I know the other insofar as I do not know
him (I do not see him) as such. I am known by the other insofar as he re-
mains unknown (and unseen) as such.
Seeing the other would therefore mean seeing that which makes of him
no longer an object, but an other—namely, that he sees like I myself see,
without making himself seen. But the fact that I see is not seen, neither by
me, nor a fortiori by others. It is undergone through the struggle of con-
sciousnesses seeking to be recognized. Hegel understood this and described
it: either I am dead, or I am an object. Dead? Not exactly, for I certainly
remain alive if I am the victor. But I was able to become this victor only
because I preferred to risk dying as spirit (like the one who sees through
judgment, who exercises the inspection mentis, who puts into operation the
labor and the suffering of the negative), over subsisting as a mere perma-
nent object, without spirit (as a thinking object, a servant or a slave): “And
it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won; only thus is it
proved that for self-consciousness, its essential being is not [ just] being,
not the immediate form in which it appears, not its submergence in the
expanse of life, but rather that there is nothing vorhanden present in it,
nothing which could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is only pure
being-for-itself. ”46 For seeing only allows the seeing of objects: “the unessen-
45 Blaise Pascal,Pensées, Lafuma §688; trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin, 1995), 217,
translation modified.
46 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1977), 114, 116, 113, emphases modified, and Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister, 6th
ed. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952), 144 and 143.
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tial consciousness [the servant] is for the lord the object [der Gegenstand].”47
Without this passage and this risk of the negative, without the true moment
of consciousness, we (I and the other) remain “for each other like ordinary
objects [gemeiner Gegenstände].”48 The difficulty of being seen (as such, not
as an object, an empirical me) consists first of all in the difficulty of being
seen by an other, who likewise is not an object, an empirical me constituted
as such by me (who alone is to assume the function of transcendental I ).
As a good commentator on this point, Sartre clearly summed up the
aporia of the objectifying vision, which is necessarily objectifying of the
other: “But the Other is still an object for me.”49 How do we get past this ob-
jectification, which conceals the other from me at the very moment of
presenting him to me, concealing him from me all the more as it presents
him to me in this way? How do we avoid objectifying that which is subject
to vision (whether it is me or an other than me)? “My apprehension of
the Other in the world as probably being a man refers to my permanent
possibility of being-seen-by-him; that is, to the permanent possibility that a
subject who sees me may be substituted for the object seen by me. ‘Being-
seen-by-the-Other’ is the truth of ‘seeing-the-Other’.”50 We find in Sartre the
coincidence of videre with videri, as we already saw in Nicholas of Cusa, with
a fundamental difference: for Cusanus, the equivalence allows access to the
other (Christ as icon), while for Sartre it forbids seeing anything more than
an object. To the question, “What does being seen mean for me?”51 Sartre
can answer only with the plain affirmation of objectity: “My gaze simply
manifests a relation in the midst of the world, a relation of myself-as-object
to the object-gazed-at”;52 and he can do no better, because “if in the up-
surge of the Other’s gaze, I paid attention to the gaze or to the Other, this
could be only as to objects, for attention is an intentional direction toward
objects.”53 Indeed, if one sets down that every gaze is intentional, and that
every intentionality is of an object, then it follows that every gaze on the
Other (coming fromme) or onme (coming from the Other) will reach nei-
ther the Other, nor me, but objects. “In short there are two authentic atti-
tudes: that by which I recognize the Other as the subject through whom I
get my objectity—this is shame; and that by which I apprehend myself as
the free object by which the Other gets his being-other—this is arrogance
[l’orgueil] or the affirmation of my freedom confronting the Other-as-
47 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 116; Phänomenologie des Geistes, 144.
48 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 113; Phänomenologie des Geistes, 143.
49 Jean-Paul Sartre, L’être et le néant (Paris: Gallimard, Edition Tel, 1943, 1976), 295, and Being
and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Wash-
ington Square Press, 1966), 343.
50 Sartre, L’être et le néant, 296; Being and Nothingness, 345.
51 Sartre, L’être et le néant, 298; Being and Nothingness, 347.
52 Sartre, L’être et le néant, 305; Being and Nothingness, 356 (mod.).
53 Sartre, L’être et le néant, 308; Being and Nothingness, 359 (mod.).
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object.”54 Within the horizon of the object (better named by Sartre objec-
tity), the only two possible visions of the one (I, ego) and of the other (the
other) are defined as arrogance (seeing the other as an object) or shame
(being seen myself as an object).
What other gaze would allow for seeing and being seen without finding
oneself within the horizon of the object? What other mode of seeing would
not immediately and necessarily transform (by virtue of the objectifying
character of intentionality) the one who sees [le voyant], me (the ego), or
the other (the alter ego), into a voyeur?55 In order to be able to see oneself
seen as such, and not make oneself seen as an object, it would thus be
necessary to change horizons, which means, exit from the horizon of ob-
jectity, and thus escape from the necessarily objectifying gaze. But what
evasion will allow for such an exodus? For, if nothing less than changing
horizons is necessary, it will have to happen right away, at once, without tran-
sition or mediation. It is because it dreads or is unaware of this radicality
that contemporary thought strains to open access to the other as such.
VI. THE NONOBJECTIFYING ICON
And it is on the contrary because Nicholas of Cusa practiced and con-
fronted this radicality that he conceived the access to God and, by trans-
position, could be able to clear away the aporia that blocks our access to the
other. In other words, the radical decisions undertaken in order to open
the visio Dei could allow the opening of the vision of the other, with the case
of the icona Dei becoming a model for envisaging the face of the other. It
makes sense, then, to pinpoint the decisions taken by Nicholas of Cusa
regarding the gaze of God and to measure whether and to what extent they
can be transposed in view of the gaze of the other. These decisions, which
concern all the visus Dei, are three in number: (1) as icon, the seen face of
God (visus Dei) does not allow itself to be objectified; (2) as icon, God’s gaze
(visus eiconae) does not objectify but renders to each his own visibility, in-
dividualizes him, and in this way makes itself visible; and (3) these two
movements surpassing objectivity through the visus Dei draw their possi-
54 Sartre, L’être et le néant, 330; Being and Nothingness, 386 (mod.).
55 In a sense no one has posed this question—how to pass from the other as an intentional
object to the other as an alter ego?—better thanHusserl. But his answer remains limited by two
difficulties: (a) The definitive appresentation of the other (Cartesianische Meditationen, §50) can
only be surmounted by a suite of indirect operations: the “apperceptive transfer (apperzeptive
Übertragung),” “pairing” (Paarung, §51), spatial transfer (§54), the analogy of the body of flesh
(§55) and empathy (Einfühlung); but these all presuppose what they are supposed to al-
low: access to the other. (b) Logically, the real answer comes not from the second term (the
other), but from a third term, the known object, such as it results from an intersubjective
constitution (§§56ff.). In other words, the horizon of objectity remains unsurpassable, and, if
we are able to comprehend there our community of objects constituted in common with the
other, we nevertheless can never see the other within that horizon otherwise than as an object.
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bility only from the fact that, for God, seeing is equivalent to loving (videre
tuum est amare):56 while the gaze of the natural attitude (ours) occupies it-
self first with seeing without any concern for loving, at the risk of not loving
in order better to possess ½pour mieux re-garder, God sees insofar as he
loves, and to the extent that he loves—that is to say, he sees universally, be-
cause he loves infinitely.
Let’s consider the first decision—as icon, the face of God is not objec-
tified. Indeed it makes sense to go back to the phenomenality of the icon,
which properly always proceeds from the gaze, but a gaze that is over-
turned: no longer the result of the aim of an ego (which sometimes aims at
a maximum object, as in the case of an idol), but the impact of an aim that
considers me and rests itself on me.57 Thus the visio Dei signifies, as we have
seen, first and foremost God’s vision, much more than our vision of God.
Above all, the visus eiconae always indicates the gaze coming from the iconic
image and allowing for seeing precisely by seeing oneself seen by Christ: “Et
si figendo obtutum in eiconam [the gaze of the man on the image] ambu-
labit de occasu ad orientem, comperiet continue visum eiconae [the gaze
coming from God] secum pergere” (Even if while fixing his gaze on the
icon, a brother walks from west to east, he will discover that the icon’s gaze
continuously follows him).58 This prior gaze, which renders every other
gaze (all our gazes) posterior and definitively derived, does not constitute
an attribute of God (or of the other), but his fund and his center: “visus
tuus, qui est tua essentia.”59 God (or the other) sees as such, not only in the
sense of the old etymology that assimilates divinity to vision (“visus tuus,
qui est theos”),60 but because he manifests himself or reveals himself in so
very far as he sees. In other terms, radical alterity (that of God, and thus
also that of the other) does not disclose itself in the difference between
regions of the visible under the aim of a common gaze, but through the
distance between the regions of the visible (which see themselves seen), on
the one hand, and, on the other, the invisible insistence of the other gaze,
which envisages. A decisive consequence follows: concerning God, there is
nothing other to see than his gaze and his aim: “Visus tuus, Domine, est
facies tua” (The aim of your gaze, Lord, is the only face that you can ever
show).61 And this gaze, by definition and phenomenal necessity, cannot be
56 De visione Dei, IV, §10, 14.
57 To the question of an exit from the horizon of objectity, we have a simpler answer at our
disposal: the visio Dei, as experience and practice of the eicona Dei, belongs precisely, as icon, to
the saturated phenomenon, by opposition to every poor or common law phenomenon or
object (see Marion, Being Given, §21 and §23, and In Excess, throughout). But this answer is still
too formal to meet the argument.
58 And, going forward, this gaze does not let him go: “similiter eum non deseret” (De visione
Dei, Praefatio, §3, 6; Bond, 236).
59 De visione Dei, IX, §32 and §35, 31, 33; Bond, 249, 250.
60 Ibid., VIII, §31, 31; Bond, 249 (see n. 27 above).
61 Ibid., VI, §19, 21; Bond, 243 (mod.).
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seen as the object of a spectacle. The gaze remains invisible and thus de-
livers the truth of his invisible face: “veritatem faciei tuae invisibilem.”62
The icon’s gaze indeed weighs on me, but not as it would crush an object.
Rather it weighs on me because it calls me and it follows me (like a follow
spot light in the theater illuminates the main actor). Moreover, this is how
to understand divine pro-vidence, since indeed “visio tua providentia est.”63
This iconic gaze in fact gives the very characteristics of the other: unfore-
seeable because it is the first to come forth, prior to or independent of my
aim, this gaze also holds me under its guard and protects me only because it
warns me; and (if we restrict ourselves to a finite other) it could threaten
me, knowing a truth about me that perhaps I hide frommyself or am simply
unaware of. We will not be surprised, then, that this gaze and this aim ask
for a response, a free acceptance: “Sed tam nobilis es, Deus meus, ut velis
in libertate esse rationalium animarum te diligere vel non” (But you are so
magnanimous, my God, that you will for rational souls to be free to love
you or not to love you).64 In fact, to see this invisible gaze can mean only to
respond to it, since once there is nothing to see on the face of God but his
gaze, it follows that this gaze, which cannot show anything, can only make
itself noticed by speaking: “Et occurrit mihi, Domine, quod visus tuus lo-
quatur; nam non est aliud loqui tuum quam videre tuum” (The thought oc-
curs to me, O Lord, that your gaze speaks, for your speaking is not other than
your seeing).65 This extraordinary anticipation of the formulas of Levinas
nevertheless limits itself, in a sense, to drawing out all of the consequences
contained in a formula of St. Paul (in Romans 4:17): “vocas ad esse quae
non sunt” ([the God] who calls into existence the things that are not).66 On
these terms, the visio Dei is freed from the horizon of objectity and no one
can or should be able, strictly speaking, to idolize it.
The second decision remains: as icon, God’s gaze (visus eiconae) does not
objectify but renders to each one his proper visibility. For the metaphysical
objection still remains alive: how would I not become an object under God’s
(or the other’s) gaze? Or put another way: supposing that the icon, which
gazes at me, escapes from the horizon of objectity, what guarantee is there
that I, in having its gaze weigh on me, will not be buried ever deeper in
objectity by this icon as it frees itself? How can I, remaining under a gaze
62 Ibid., VI, §17, 20; Bond, 243.
63 Ibid., VIII, §28, 28; Bond, 248: “your vision is your providence.” Providence in fact means
consideration [prévenance] and anticipation, that of the father who watches for the return of
his son (evoked in the same text): prior paternus oculus, the preceding gaze of the father, who
anticipates and sees further.
64 Ibid., XVIII, §80, 63–64; Bond, 271.
65 Ibid., X, §38, 35; Bond, 252; emphasis added.
66 Ibid., X, §40, 37; Bond, 253. See “in se nihil est et nihil mansisset, si tu non vocasses ipsum
de nihilo” (that which in itself is nothing and would have remained nothing had you not called
it forth out of nothing) (De visione Dei, V, §14, 18; Bond, 241); and: “Vocare enim ad esse, quae
non sunt, est communicare esse nihilo” (To call into being things which are not is to com-
municate being to nothing) (De visione Dei, XII, §49, 43; Bond, 257).
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(even the nonobjectifiable gaze of an icon), avoid findingmyself reduced to
the dishonorable rank of an object (of a me, with ego)? This danger makes
itself all themore pressing in that it has to do not with the gaze of an other, a
mere alter ego, but that of an infinite other (God): his specular gaze (oculus
specularis), which comprehends “omnium species,”67 could, as “forma for-
marum,”68 exert itself as a perfect panopticon, from which the objectification
of a divine Big Brother would rule. With the overturning of videre into videri,
wouldn’t we simply meet up again with the metaphysical equivalence fixed
by Berkeley on behalf of the metaphysical system of ontology, under the
famous terms Existence is percipi or percipere?69
We must not answer the question by examining only the icon in general;
first of all, because the icon never goes into action in general, since it exerts
a gaze and there is no gaze in general, but always an individualizing and
individualized gaze—to the point that it alone probably attains individu-
alization. Moreover, here, we are talking about the icon of Christ. Now, this
icon is not limited to putting into action an all-seeing gaze in general, that
would see all its spectators; Nicholas of Cusa acknowledges in it a gaze that
is more complete and complex than this—a gaze that sees all and at the
same time each one: “admirabimini, quomodo hoc fieri possit, quod omnes
et singulos simul respiciat” (you will marvel at how it is possible that the face
looks on all and each one of you at the same time).70 He insists here: “Sic quidem
ades omnibus et singulis, sicut ipsis omnibus et singulis adest esse, sine quo
non possunt esse” (Indeed, you are present to all and to each, just as being,
without which they cannot exist);71 “unico intuitu omnia simul et singulariter
discernas” (with one glance, you discern [all things] and each individual thing
at one and the same time).72 In the field of objectity (and thus of discrete
quantity) the rule seems to be that we either see everyone or we see each
one in particular. However, in the case of God (and probably of the other,
too), seeing everyone does not contradict seeing each one, for the issue is
no longer that of quantity, nor of number or measure. Here, seeing no
longer aims at regarding, but at safeguarding—making the one toward whom
the gaze is extended feel that he is taken into consideration as the unique
67 Ibid., VIII, §30, 30; Bond, 249.
68 Ibid., XV, §63, 53; Bond, 264.
69 George Berkeley, Commonplace Book, in The Works of George Berkeley, ed. A. Campbell Fraser
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1901; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005),
1:10.
70 De visione Dei, Praefatio, §3, 5; Bond, 236; emphasis added.
71 Ibid., IV, §9, 13; Bond, 239.
72 Ibid., VIII, §29, 29; Bond, 248. “Admiror, Domine, postquam tu simul omnes et singulos
respicis, uti haec etiam picta figurat imago, quam intueor, quomodo coincidat in virtute tua
visiva universale cum singulari” (You look on all and each together, even as does this painted
image that I contemplate, and so I marvel, O Lord, at how in your visual faculty the univer-
sal coincides with the particular) (De visione Dei, IX, §32, 31; Bond, 249). And “universalis pater
pariter et singularis” (equally universal and individual father) (De visione Dei, VII, §27, 28; Bond,
247); or: “tunc clare experior, quod tu simul omnia vides et singula” (I experience clearly that
you see all things and each thing together) (De visione Dei, X, §38, 35; Bond, 252).
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beloved (for love wills unicity as much as it does eternity). Under this safe-
guarding ‘regard’ (gaze), which places him under the guard of the icon,
each and every one experiences himself as unique: “quisque vestrum ex-
perietur, ex quocumque loco eandem [namely, icona] inspexerit, se quasi
solum per eam videri” (and each of you will experience that from whatever
place one observes it [the icon] the face will seem to regard him alone).73
The one who sees himself seen sees himself not only as the uniquely viewed
by God’s aim, but also as the one preferred by his attention, before every
other other: “Ita enim tu absolutum esse omnium ades cunctis, quasi non
sit tibi cura de quoquam alio. . . . Ita enim tu, Domine, intueris quodlibet,
quod est, ut non possit concipi per omne id, quod est, te aliam curam
habere, quam ut id solum sit meliori modo, quo esse potest, atque quod
omnia alia, quae sunt, ad hoc solum sint, ut serviant ad id, quod illud sit
optime, quod tu respicis” (For thus you, who are the absolute being of all,
are present to all as if you had concern for no other. . . . For you, Lord, so
look on anything that exists that no existing thing can conceive that you
have any other care but that it alone exist in the best manner possible for
it and that all other existing things exist only for the purpose of serving
the best state of the one which you are beholding).74 We might be tempted
to denounce in this passage the sacrilegious importation, so to speak, of the
egocentrism of the ego (and in fact of every creature), right into divine
charity—unless it is about something else entirely.
First of all, it is about God’s privilege, about the propriety of the visus
eiconae to make coincide within itself that which is opposed in our use of the
gaze—the globality of apprehension and the focalization of attention,
universal love and particular love. But the issue here is not only a case of
the coincidence of opposites (even if it is one such instance that we have the
least difficulty in conceiving); at stake above all is an absolutely singular
characteristic of the love that comes from God, and which common un-
derstanding disfigures into a predestination of some to the detriment of
many. Indeed, unlike us, God does not love following an arbitrary election
of certain individuals (or even of me alone) to the exclusion of others (or
73 Ibid., Praefatio, §3, 5; Bond, 236; emphasis added. And also “videt, quod ita diligenter
curam agit cuiuslibet quasi de solo eo, qui experitur se videri, et nullo alio curet, adeo quod
etiam concipi nequeat per unum, quem respicit, quod curam alterius agat” (He will see that it
takes diligent care of each, just as if it cared only for the one on whom its gaze seems to rest and
for no other, and to such an extent that the one whom it regards cannot conceive that it should
care for another) (De visione Dei, Praefatio, §4, 6; Bond, 236).
74 Ibid., IV, §9, 13, 14; Bond, 239. See: “Nequaquam, Domine, me concipere sinis
quacumque imaginatione, quod tu, Domine, aliud a me plus me diligas, cum me solum visus
tuus non deserat” (By no imagining, Lord, do you allow me to conceive that you love anything
other than me more than me, for it is I alone that your gaze does not abandon) (De visione Dei,
IV, §9, 14; Bond, 239). And “quia tu me continua visione amplecteris, quando amorem meum
ad te solum converto, quia tu, qui caritas es, ad me solum es conversus” (You hold me in your
constant vision, and when I direct my love to you alone because you, who are love, are turned
toward me alone) (De visione Dei, IV, §11, 15; Bond, 240).
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even all the others); we must choose our beloveds (like so many “charity
cases”) among whom to share out our penury of love; but God loves infi-
nitely (absolutely) each one (in particular) in such a way that each experi-
ences the feeling of becoming the privileged beloved, tangentially the only
one; I experience this feeling under God’s safeguarding gaze and Imust
experience it since I am experiencing myself finally seen as such, finally
completely individualized. What theoretical knowledge never succeeds in
accomplishing is accomplished by the visus eiconae by giving me the certainty
of being loved absolutely for myself, of receiving not only filiation, but the
filiation of an only son, of enjoying the privilege of identifying myself with
the Son’s identity, in whom the Father takes delight. And each one of the
others, for example each of the monks of Tegernsee, can and must expe-
rience, through the praxis of the iconic gaze, becoming himself because he
sees himself seen as the only son in the Son. Thus, under the icon’s gaze,
I finally enjoy myself because for the first time I become who I am. And if
I thus receive the ultimate individualization—if I discover myself as the
unique and preferred one in this sense—then I have already escaped the
horizon of objectity.
And, because the iconic gaze does not possess what it sees, it succeeds
in rendering it possible and thus existent: “Apparuisti deinde mihi ut ab
omnibus visibilis, quia in tantum res est, in quantum tu eam vides, et ipsa
non esset actu, nisi te videret. Visio enim praestat esse, quia est essentia tua”
(Later you appeared to me as visible by all, for a thing exists only as you see
it, and it would not actually exist unless it saw you. For your vision confers
being, since your vision is your essence).75 The iconic gaze does not see
a being that is already there, awaiting in its being a gaze to come visit it;
here the being is precisely insofar as it sees itself seen; it receives itself
from the simple fact of showing itself to be seen: “Nihil est, quod visus tuus
non videat” (Nothing is which your sight does not see).76 Through the
crossing of two gazes, the gazing gazed at and the gazed at gazing, that
which is not God nor of the same manner as God is kept alive: “Ab omnibus
creaturis es visibilis et omnes vides; in eo enim, quod omnes vides, videris
ab omnibus. Aliter enim esse non possunt creaturae, quia visione tua sunt;
quod si te non viderent videntem, a te non caperent esse” (You are visible
by all creatures and you see all. In that you see all you are seen by all. For
otherwise creatures cannot exist since they exist by your vision. If they did
not see you who see, they would not receive being from you).77 Thus I
75 Ibid., XII, §47, 41; Bond, 256; which continues: “Sic, Deus meus, es invisibilis pariter ac
visibilis. Invisibilis es, uti tu es, visibilis es, uti creatura es, quae in tantum est, in quantum te
videt” (Thus, my God, you are equally invisible and visible. As you are, you are invisible; as the
creature is, which exists only insofar as the creature sees you, you are visible).
76 Ibid., IX, §37, 35; Bond, 252 (mod.).
77 Ibid., X, §40, 36; Bond, 253.
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remain only by staying under the protection of the gaze of God (and of
the other) and, under this safeguard, I am not an object. This is also why,
moreover, I no longer have to claim for myself an ego: “In tantum enim
sum, in quantum tu mecum es; et cum videre tuum sit esse tuum, ideo ego
sum, quia tu me respicis, et si a me vultum tuum subtraxeris, nequaquam
subsistam” (I exist only insomuch as you are with me. And since your seeing
is your being, therefore, because you regard me, I am, and if you remove
your face from me, I will cease to be).78 Neither object nor ego (subject),
I receive myself from that through which (or through whom) I see myself
seen. Under the visus eiconae, neither I nor my brothers become objects; in-
stead, each and every one of us sees ourselves seen as a unique and privi-
leged son.
VII. THE REGARDING GAZE SAFEGUARDS, THE AIM LOVES
And yet this response—nothing is safe unless it sees itself seen by the icon
of God—seemingly fails to dispel every ambiguity; for, after all, one could
read here the very principle of absolute power, namely, that no one is gen-
uinely recognized as present in its court if he does not enjoy a sovereign
gaze.
In fact, however, this objection does not make much sense, because it
presupposes what precisely must be proved: that the sovereign reigns and
gazes in order better to guard and keep. Now, the first two movements
beyond objectivity through the visus Dei draw their possibility from the
third: that, for God, seeing is equivalent to loving. In other words, when the
eicona Dei envisages, its gaze safeguards. It safeguards by virtue of its privi-
lege, which for us is unthinkable: it loves. “Et quoniam ibi oculus ubi amor,
tunc te me diligere experior, quia oculi tui sunt super me servulum tuum
attentissimi. Domine, videre tuum est amare” (And since the eye is there wher-
ever love is, I experience that you love me because your eyes rest most
attentively on me, your humble servant. Your seeing, Lord, is your loving).79
Let us understand clearly: the eye is found, is discovered, and exerts itself
there where love is, and not the contrary; the eye does not develop itself
in love, as if it were making love (like the seducer’s eye, which gazes in order
to make a grab and ends up by possessing), but rather it is love that opens
the eyes, that makes (the) eyes and allows what the eye sees to see itself
loved, and therefore to see itself lovable in the gaze that loves it. In God, love
78 Ibid., IV, §10, 14; Bond, 240. This formula could seem to refute in advance Descartes’s
cogito: I am not because I think (myself), but because I find myself seen (and therefore
thought) by another. But for one detail: the ego of the cogito also finds itself seen or under the
gaze of another: “aliquis Deus, vel quocunque nomine illum vocem” (a God, or whatever I may
call him) (Meditatio II, AT VII, 24; The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2:16).
79 De visione Dei, IV, §10, 14; Bond, 239; emphasis added; and which continues: “visus tuus est
bonitas illa maxima” (your gaze is that maximum goodness) (ibid.; Bond, 240).
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alone sees (and it sees everything): “Amare tuum est videre tuum. Paternitas
tua est visio” (Your loving is your seeing. Your fatherhood is your vision).80
And, seeing in order to allow each thing to see itself seen, he thus makes it
appear: “Non est videre tuum nisi vivificare, nisi dulcissimum amorem tui
continue immittere” (Your seeing is nothing other than your bringing to
life, nothing other than your continuously imparting your sweetest love).81
Thus, for the icon, or in other words for the antecedent gaze of God onme,
intentionality does not aim at an object, nor anything else in the mode of
objectity; indeed, when intentionality arises first and radically from God, it
takes the figure, for us brand new, for him originary, of love, and it always
sights a beloved, who then can become a lover. God sees and aims only in
loving: “tu . . . quia amor amans, nihil odire potes” (you . . . can hate nothing
because you are the love that loves).82 Herein lies the most radical differ-
ence, first, between phenomenology and theology, and next between being
seen by an other in the mode of the ego and being seen by an other in the
mode of the icon of God: the intentionality does not end up in objectity, or
aim at an object, but puts love into action and sights a beloved, who can in
turn become a lover.
The intentionality of the icon thus operates from the outset in terms of
what I have elsewhere thematized as the reduction to givenness and the
erotic reduction—it aims (and constitutes) only insofar as it loves. And this
is why, according to Nicholas of Cusa, by passing from the intentionality of
objectity to the intentionality of love, Jesus pierces through the vision of
the other limited to his accidents, to go as far as the vision of the other (or,
as it happens, of me) in his final essence as lover: “Videbas igitur, Ihesu,
oculo humano accidentia visibilia, sed visu divino absoluto rerum substan-
tiam. Nemo umquam in carne constitutus praeter te, Ihesu, substantiam
vidit aut rerum quiditatem” (Therefore with your human eye, O Jesus, you
saw the visible accidents, but with your divine and absolute sight you saw
the substance of things. No one constituted in flesh, except you, O Jesus,
ever perceived the substance or quiddity of things).83
Nicholas of Cusa recognizes and takes stock of the proper actions of this
intrinsically loving gaze. The intentionally erotic gaze takes pity on the
other, rather than power over him: “Quando autem ad te revertitur [the
prodigal son of Luke 15], sine mora tu ei occurris, et antequam te respiciat,
tu paterno affectu in eum oculos misericordiae inicis. Nec est aliud tuum
misereri quam tuum videre” (Yet as soon as the sinner returns to you, with-
out delay you hurry to meet the sinner, and before the sinner sees you, you
cast your eyes of mercy on the sinner in parental affection. For with
80 Ibid., VIII, §27, 28; Bond, 247.
81 Ibid., IV, §12, 16; Bond, 240.
82 Ibid., XVIII, §80, 63; Bond, 270–71.
83 Ibid., XXII, §97, 76; Bond, 279; emphasis added. Contrary to the other’s view of my at-
tributes, which lack my substance, as Pascal pointed out (see n. 45 above).
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you having mercy is no different than seeing).84 He follows what he loves,
like a follow spot light follows an actor that it seeks to make visible. The
safeguarding gaze acts in the name and to the benefit of the one that it
loves: “Tu igitur es Deus meus, qui omnia vides, et videre tuum est operari”
(You, therefore, are my God, who sees everything, and your seeing is your
working).85 And thus, “videre tuum est creare tuum” (your seeing is your
creating).86 To the point where, finally, because “God is love” and God loves
by seeing what he loves and makes to be insofar as he sees it (and sees it
seeing the one who loves it), God consists only in this erotic gaze: “Visus
tuus, Domine, est essentia tua” (Your sight, Lord, is your essence).87
The loving aim of the gaze necessarily results in a trinitarian unfolding.
For if the gaze does not objectify or allow itself to be measured objectively,
but gives itself and is received, we of course must attribute it to the icon of
Christ; and for that very reason, we must lead its play back to the Trinity,
which is to say, we must recognize, in the crossing of gazes, the final gaze,
the person of the Spirit: “A posse in infinitum amare et posse in infinitum
amari oritur amoris nexus infinitus ipsius infiniti amantis et infiniti am-
abilis” (From the power to love infinitely and the power to be loved infi-
nitely arises an infinite bond of love between the infinite lover and the
infinite lovable).88 And this is why the “brothers” would not be able to trust
one another89 if they did not first regard one another within a safeguarding
gaze. Or in other words, if they did not first find themselves within the site
and the praxis of the eicona Dei, where seeing oneself seen as the unique
beloved, the preferred son in the only Son, can alone be experienced.90
84 De visione Dei, V, §15, 18; Bond, 242, which concludes, “Videre tuum est movere tuum”
(Moreover, your seeing is your moving).
85 Ibid., V, §16, 19; Bond, 242.
86 Ibid., XII, §49, 42; Bond, 257. See “videre tuum est causare” (Your seeing is causing). Ibid.
VIII, §29, 29; Bond, 248.
87 Ibid., IX, §32, 31; Bond, 250.
88 Ibid., XVII, §71, 58; Bond, 267.
89 The credere of the Praefatio, §3, 6 (Bond, 236) (underscored by de Certeau) finds its filial
fulfilment in the se confidere [verbo magistri] of XXIV, §112, 85 (Bond, 286).
90 De visione Dei, XXV, §117, 88; Bond, 288.
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